In Paris, we were given promises. You even made promises to our President Erdogan. We did not want to accept the adaptation of the Paris Agreement at the 2015 plenary session. Merkel and Hollande both called our president twice on the same day to say that the Paris agreement was an important agreement that Turkey should not reject. They promised us to solve this problem during their respective mandates. President Erdoğan called us, informed us of these promises and told us not to oppose them. However, in the year following the Paris Agreement, France did not provide the necessary support to find a solution. Then we went to Marrakech. We met with the Moroccan presidency to resolve the problem.
They have begun a consultation process that is open to results. We have informed each of the 195 countries why Turkey needs the GCF and multilateral bank loans. After US President Donald Trump`s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on 21 June 2017, the daily HaberTürk reported that Turkey had set a share of the Green Climate Fund as a precondition for ratifying the agreement and approving the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). On June 1, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the agreement.  Pursuant to Article 28, the agreement that entered into force in the United States on November 4, 2016 is the earliest possible date for the effective withdrawal of the United States on November 4, 2020. If it had decided to withdraw by leaving the UNFCCC, it could be immediately denounced (the UNFCCC entered into force for the United States in 1994) and enter into force a year later. On August 7, 2017, the Trump administration officially transmitted to the United Nations a communication according to which the United States intends to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as it has the legal right to do so.  The invitation to resign could only be presented after the agreement entered into force for the United States for three years in 2019.   Instead of investing all its energy and capacity in its search for special treatment within the regime, Turkey must instead prepare and strengthen the institutional capacities necessary for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Before ratification, Turkey has yet to become one of the contracting parties, but once it accedes, Turkey will find it difficult to comply with the engagement and verification process that is a legally binding element of the Paris Agreement. In addition to implementing and communicating the INDC based on its engagement and review approach, the agreement also establishes a strong and comprehensive transparency framework, building on the EXISTING UNFCCC monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms, and strengthening them in a way that requires parties to be more accountable.
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